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Technology, Competition, and Values
Frank Pasquale*
Toward the end of his study Diffusion of Innovations,
Everett Rodgers surveys the distributive effects of new
technologies.1 He concludes that new technologies tend to
increase the gap between haves and have-nots, as the wealthy
and powerful gain advantages over those unable to afford
technologies or products. Rodgers’ study focuses on what is
usually thought of as the cure for this process: the diffusion of
innovation across society. However, Rodgers notes that due to
the “windfall profits” often available to early adopters of
technology, even the “diffusion of innovations usually decreases
the degree of equality in a social system.”2
Law can advance or retard the distributive effects of
innovation and its diffusion in many ways.
Certain
technologies merit special monitoring because they promote the
leveraging of economic advantage into social or cultural
advantage without substantially increasing overall social
welfare.3 Others threaten to undermine collective values and
perceptions commonly used to evaluate technology.4 A final
© 2007 Frank Pasquale.
* Professor Pasquale joined Seton Hall after practicing law as an attorney at
Arnold & Porter LLP, where his work included antitrust and intellectual
property litigation. Professor Pasquale's prior experience includes clerking for
the Honorable Judge Kermit Lipez of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit and serving as a fellow at the Institute for the Defense of
Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property in Lima, Peru.
1. EVERETT ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 429-34 (4th ed. 1995).
2. Id. at 430.
3. See, e.g., Posting of Frank Pasquale to PrawfsBlawg, How Opal Got
Ahead,
available
at
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/05/how_opal_got_ah.html
(May 9, 2006, 18:40 EST) (discussing the role of consulting services in creating
position-enhancing information for application to elite colleges). I refer to
such innovation as primarily re-allocative, rather than primarily generative, of
social welfare.
4. See, e.g., Posting of Frank Pasquale to Law and Technology Theory,
Two
Relationships
Between
Law
and
Technology,
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category threatens to do both, creating unfair or wasteful
competition while blunting our capacity to recognize its morally
dubious character.
The law’s current emphasis on innovation is
understandable to the extent that it improves social welfare.
However, much technology is used not just simply to improve
its user’s life, but also to help its user gain advantage over
others. Expensive sport utility vehicles (SUVs) have provoked
a “highway arms race,”5 since the “extra weight of SUVs
rearranges where deaths occur in crashes, transferring deaths
from the SUVs to the cars.”6 The net neutrality debate may be
framed in similar, if less macabre, zero-sum terms: whose
content gets where faster and at what cost?7 Tollbooths on the
internet, which are designed to bring information from certain
websites to users more quickly than from other websites,
illustrate one answer to this question.8
http://techtheory.blogspot.com/2006/12/two-relationships-betweentechnology.html (Dec. 6, 2006, 9:04 EST) (“To bioethicists like Carl Elliott,
using drugs to alleviate mild alienation may lead to self-betrayal, since
intuitions about the worth or worthlessness of forms of life around us are
constitutive of our identity.”).
5. See Michelle J. White, The “Arms Race” on American Roads: The
Effect of Sport Utility Vehicles and Pickup Trucks on Traffic Safety, 47 J.L. &
ECON. 333, 333 (2004) (discussing the highway arms race).
6. KEITH BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY: THE DANGEROUS RISE OF THE
SUV 170 (Public Affairs 2003). Regulators estimate SUVs cause 2000 extra
deaths a year. Id. at 169. However, they contribute little or nothing to the
safety of their occupants and greatly increase the danger of driving for nonSUV drivers. Id. at xv. Gregg Easterbrook describes some additional
problems:
These vehicles have converted driving . . . into a nerve-wracking
Darwinian battle. . . . [They] are designed to bring out the worst in
their owners while simultaneously making them feel that they are
invincible. . . . Traffic studies show that the typical SUV occupies as
much road and parking space as 1.4 regular cars.
Gregg Easterbrook, Axle of Evil, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 20, 2003, at 27-28,
available
at
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030120&s=easterbrook012003; see also
Posting of Frank Pasquale to Jurisdynamics, SUVs, Ethanol and Distributive
Justice,
http://jurisdynamics.blogspot.com/2006/10/suvs-ethanol-anddistributive-justice.html (Oct. 9, 2006, 14:24).
7. Posting of Frank Pasquale to Concurring Opinions, Net Neutrality:
Law,
Money,
and
Culture,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/10/net_neutrality.html (Oct.
18, 2006, 15:58) (discussing the competitive dynamics that could be unleashed
if access guarantees and broadband speed were commodified in certain ways).
8. Editorial, Tollbooths on the Internet Highway, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
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At one point in time, we could perhaps count on a common,
technologically unmediated response to these dilemmas. But
mind-focused technological interventions such as therapeutic
forgetting,9 some forms of cosmetic psychopharmacology,10 and
new attention-enhancement drugs11 may diminish our store of
collective values and common perceptions.12 They may promote
competition in the new technological arms races, rather than
social questioning of their fairness or the premises of new
technologies.13 This process can raise deep problems for
theorists, for it heralds the technological undermining of the
very values upon which we rely to judge technology.
In this short piece I cannot propose solutions to the
growing problem of technological arms races and the
technological blunting of qualms about them. However, I can
outline some of the dilemmas these developments create, and
suggest direction for some policy responses. As new sectors of
life become more game-like and competitive, methods of
leveling the playing field developed in sports and college
admissions might become more broadly relevant.14 Inequality
impact statements may be as important to our cultural
2006, at A14.
9. See generally Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and
Ethical Implications of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2006).
10. See generally Ashley Pettus, Psychiatry by Prescription, HARV. MAG.,
July-Aug. 2006, at 38 (discussing whether those who are receiving prescription
drugs for mental health issues need them in all cases).
11. David Plotz, Wake up Little Susie: Can We Sleep Less?, SLATE, Mar. 7,
2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2079113.
12. See Kolber, supra note 9, at 1613-22.
13. The analysis here might be deemed part of the school identified as
“managed technological skepticism” in a recent report on cognitive
enhancement. See CONSORTIUM FOR SCI., POLICY & OUTCOMES AT ARIZ.
STATE UNIV. AND ADVANCED CONCEPTS GROUP, SANDIA NAT’L LABS., POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT (2006),
available
at
http://www.cspo.org/documents/FinalEnhancedCognitionReport.pdf
(“According to [the] standpoint [of Managed technological skepticism], quality
of life arises more out of a society’s institutions than its technologies. Markets
are viewed as profit-maximizing, not quality-of-life maximizing. The role of
government is to enable the more effective pursuit of social goals such as
equity and justice, rather than to promote technological advance as a proxy for
such goals.”).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT K. FULLINWIDER & JUDITH LICHTENBERG, LEVELING
THE PLAYING FIELD: JUSTICE, POLITICS AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 205-215
(2004) (summarizing their arguments of how to reform college admissions).
See generally PAUL C. WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW
CAN MAKE SPORTS BETTER FOR FANS (2000).
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environment as environmental impact statements are to the
natural world. Finally, current laws regulating the use of
controlled substances may need to be extended to precision
chemical-based emotional enhancement, even if such
pharmaceutical interventions are non-addictive. Technology
should not be allowed to accelerate wasteful or unfair arms
races or to undermine the very values we rely upon to evaluate
it.
I. THE COMMODIFICATION OF ADVANTAGE
The relationship between technology and equality is
complex. Two narratives now dominate, and two counternarratives need a better hearing. The first dominant narrative
is that a rising technological tide lifts all boats and leads to a
convergence of living standards. Adam Smith tended to explain
a convergence of living conditions as epiphenomenal of nobles’
desire for expensive baubles: “the expensive vanity of the
landlord made him willing to accept” gradual cession of power
over individual lives in exchange for the accumulation of
durable goods.15 Contemporary social commentators tend to
emphasize the enormous gains in living standards of even the
poorest Americans due to technological advance.16
Some current technological developments validate their
faith in technology’s power to democratize power and bring
convergence in living standards. For example, critics of
oligopolistic control of the United States’ music market might
frame the rise of file-sharing technology as a deeply egalitarian
Anyone with an Internet connection can
development.17
download content long locked up by an industry only recently
Internet access to
stirred to address pricing concerns.18
15. Nathan Rosenberg, Adam Smith, Consumer Tastes, and Economic
Growth, 76 J. POL. ECON. 361, 370 (1968) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 390 (Random House 1937) (1776)).
16. See, e.g., GREGG EASTERBROOK, THE PROGRESS PARADOX (2004)
(emphasizing the objective improvement of living standards even during
periods when subjective accounts of well-being appeared to stagnate or
decline).
17. See Matthew Fagin et al., Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to
Advance and Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
451, 457-58 (2002).
18. See, e.g., Posting of Mike to Techdirt, Universal Pictures Tries to Beat
Counterfeiters
at
Their
Own
Game
In
Russia,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20060407/174244.shtml (Apr. 7, 2006, 18:35
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information in general is an equalizing development; anyone
can access a trove of medical studies previously available only
to professionals.19
Yet new technologies can harden social stratification and
prompt arms races that merely reallocate (rather than produce
new) goods and services. Each of the technological examples
given above has a mirror image that undermines its initial
emancipatory promise.
From the Secure Digital Music
Initiative20 to vertical integration of content and devices,
virtually every new technology of “info-anarchy” has been
matched by a technique of perfect control, though often at the
cost of crippled and unpopular products.21 Market producers
will have very promising competitive strategies at their
disposal when they see social producers threatening their
revenue streams.22 New anti-circumvention technology is a key
part of that strategy.23 Without a fair-use infrastructure for
digital rights management24 and pricing systems that take
EST); see also Randall Stross, Want an iPhone? Beware the iHandcuffs, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, § 3, at 3; Posting of John Bennett to Against Monopoly,
http://www.againstmonopoly.org/index.php?limit=10&chunk=1&topic=IP+in+t
he+News (Jan. 16, 2007, 07:14 EST) (discussing digital restrictions
management and how it changed in South Korea “only after CD sales
collapsed.”); Posting of Ketola to Afterdawn.com, Too Expensive DVDs? Stop
Buying Them!, http://www.afterdawn.com/news/archive/4117.cfm (May 29,
2003, 16:32 EST) (discussing the Malaysian government’s response to DVD
pricing).
19. Amanda Schaffer, Open Access: Should Scientific Articles Be Available
Dec.
14,
2004,
Online
and
Free
to
the
Public?,
SLATE,
http://slate.msn.com/id/2111023; Rick Weiss, A Fight for Free Access to
Medical Research Online Plan Challenges Publishers’ Dominance, WASH.
POST, Aug. 5, 2003, at A1.
20. Secure Digital Music Initiative Homepage, http://www.sdmi.org/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2007).
21. Posting of Tim Armstrong to Info/Law, Zune Stinks? Blame Grokster,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2006/11/26/
zune-stinks-blame-grokster/ (Nov. 26, 2006, 10:49); see also Stross, supra note
18.
22. Lior Strahilevitz, Wealth Without Markets?, 116 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming
2007)
(manuscript
at
§§
IIA-IIC,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=946479) (reviewing YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS
AND FREEDOM (2006)). Benkler’s book discusses how technology makes it
easier for individuals not motivated by profit (deemed “social producers”) to
complete projects once only motivated by the profit motive (done by “market
producers”). Strahilevitz predicts that market producers will find incentives
to draw social producers back to market settings. Id.
23. See Stross, supra note 18.
24. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright
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ability to pay seriously, the vast majority of consumers could
lose out in the ensuing battle between oligopolists and
hackers.25
A similar tension is evident in the rise of technological
arms races that appear to harden existing market-based
hierarchies. Google and Amazon developed search technologies
that created fantastic clearinghouses of information. Some
claim the resulting comprehensive databases have given a
variety of small players a chance at reaching consumers.26
Rather than battling for shelf space in retail stores, rarely
purchased books, music, or films can be kept in a near-infinite
online inventory until they are accessed.
Yet the same dynamics that tilted the real-space playing
field toward dominant players can also infiltrate these new
online retailers. We have little idea of how pervasively “stealth
marketing” affects results on Amazon’s front page, personalized
recommendations, or other search results.27 New battles for
prominence in search results could lead old powerhouses to
dominate this new battlefield.28 Key advertising words are
already being auctioned, and even unpaid or organic search
results could become determined by who bids the most for
search engine optimization technology.29 Search engines
Management Systems 12-22 (Georgetown University Law Center 2000
Working Paper Series in Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No.
23973, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=239731.
25. See, e.g., David Needle, Security Vendors Debate the Arms Race,
May
3,
2007,
available
at
EARTHWEBNEWS,
http://news.earthweb.com/security/article.php/3675546 (“With the rise in
attacks, from malware and phishing to assorted viruses and identity theft, it’s
no wonder the market for security software and services is booming.”).
26. CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS
SELLING LESS OF MORE (2006).
27. Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 83, 89 (2006) (citing Letter from Heather Hippsley, Acting Assoc. Dir.
of Adver. Practices, FTC, to Gary Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert
(June
27,
2002),
available
at
http://www.commercialalert.org/PDFs/ftcresponse.pdf). But see Eric Goldman,
Stealth Risks of Regulating Marketing, 85 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 11, 12-15
(2006),
http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/volume-85/issue-1/stealth-risks-ofstealth-marketing.html.
28. See Goodman, supra note 27, at 100-103.
29. Frank Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115, 123-24 (2006); Kevin Lee, The Search Tax: Are Search
Engines Leeches?, CLICKZ, Jan. 26, 2007,
http://clickz.com/showPage.html?page=clickz_print&id=3624697;
see
also
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themselves create great social welfare.30 Yet, much of the
onslaught of follow-on technology for manipulating results
seems designed primarily to channel that welfare to those best
able to bid for it.31
II. LIMITS OF THE INCENTIVES V. ACCESS TRADE-OFF
When IP-intensive technology leads to inequality, or when
inequality prevents equal access to technology, it is often
justified by what I’ll call the second dominant narrative of
technology and equality: that we must restrict access to
intellectual property now to create incentives for its future
creation.32 This debate over the incentives versus access meme
is so dominant in the IP literature that scholars rarely focus on
a darker counternarrative: namely, that sometimes access
restrictions appear to be less about creating incentives for
future innovation than they are about preserving relative
advantage. Consider this account of price discrimination in
railways:
It is not because of the few thousand francs which would have to be
spent to put a roof over the third-class carriages or to upholster the
third-class seats that some company or other has open carriages with
wooden benches. . . . What the company is trying to do is to prevent
the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from travelling
third class; it hits the poor, not because it wants to hurt them, but to
frighten the rich . . . . And it is again for the same reason that the
companies, having proved almost cruel to third-class passengers and
mean to the second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with firstclass passengers. Having refused the poor what is necessary, they
give the rich what is superfluous.33
Frank Pasquale, The Law and Economics of Information Overload
Externalities, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at § IVA)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888410.
30. See e.g., Weiss, supra note 19.
31. See e.g., Pasquale, supra note 29, at 123-24.
32. Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of
Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=965083#PaperDownload
(last visited May 10, 2007) (“The principal economic justification for
intellectual property derives from a broader economic problem: the inability of
a competitive market to support an efficient level of innovation in some areas
of technological innovation—particularly those in which research and
development (R&D) is costly, innovation is easily perceived, and imitation is
relatively inexpensive and can occur rapidly. . . . Most firms would not invest
in developing new technologies if rivals could enter the market and dissipate
the profit before R&D costs adjusted for attendant risks could be recovered.”).
33. JULES DUPUIT, ON TOLLS AND TRANSPORT CHARGES 23 (International
Economic Papers No. 11, Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1962), quoted in James
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In other words, it is in the company’s interests to prevent
the diffusion of technologies of comfort and repose. It profits
from a scramble for better accommodations.
This may seem like a rather exceptional situation, but
society is full of examples of positional goods, where the
problem may be even more acute.34 For example, consider the
possible development of a height-enhancing pill.35 Society does
not have much interest in a general boost in height, but many
individuals do have a personal interest in being taller. Their
interest is only in their position relative to others, not in
achieving some platonic ideal of height. If such a pill were
developed, it would not change the distribution of height in
society in a productive way, but it would permit the wealthy to
escape the stigma of being in the lowest height percentiles.
That process reinforces the stigma (or at least practical
difficulty) of being at the very bottom, as extraordinary
shortness becomes a badge not merely of genetic misfortune,
but also of financial deficiency. We could imagine similar
dynamics developing in the case of other cosmetic
interventions.36 Indeed, as Sered and Fernandopulle argue in
Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and
Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2007 (2000). Cf.
BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE INNER LIFE OF THE AMERICAN
MIDDLE CLASS 251-63 (1989) (arguing for a revival of conscience and
responsibility in the middle class and a rediscovery of the lower class).
34. See Posting of Frank Pasquale to madisonian.net, A Sketch of My
Paper
on
Primarily
Position-Enhancing
Information,
http://madisonian.net/archives/2006/10/07/a-sketch-of-my-paper-on-ppei/ (Oct.
7, 2006) (defining and discussing positional goods); see also Harry Brighouse &
Adam Swift, Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods, 116 ETHICS 471 (2006)
(“[Positional goods] are goods with the property that one’s relative place in the
distribution of the good affects one’s absolute position with respect to its value.
The very fact that one is worse off than others with respect to a positional good
means that one is worse off, in some respect, than one would be if that good
were distributed equally. So while it might indeed be perverse to advocate
leveling down all things considered, leveling down with respect to positional
goods benefits absolutely, in some respect, those who would otherwise have
less than others.”); Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and
Preventable Welfare Losses, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 137, 137 (2005).
35. See Dov Fox, Human Growth Hormone and the Measure of Man, THE
NEW ATLANTIS, Fall 2004/Winter 2005, at 75, available at
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/7/fox.htm.
36. See Posting of Frank Pasquale to PrawfsBlawg, The Commodification
of
Caste,
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/05/the_commodifica.html
(May 14, 2006, 07:38 EST).
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The Uninsured in America,
The current American system in which health care is linked to
employment is creating a caste of the chronically ill, infirm, and
marginally employed. . . . Sick, lacking reliable health care, and
locked in employment situations . . . that do not offer medical
benefits, they find it increasingly difficult to escape. . . . Illness itself
constitutes a physical marker: rotten teeth, chronic coughs, bad skin,
a limp, . . . – all of these signal caste in basic ways.37

Thus, ill health is not simply the result of a poor
employment situation, but also often its cause. Many
employers who offer health insurance will examine applicants’
physical markers indicating lack of health and dental care in
the past, and refuse to hire applicants based on unfair
presumptions about these markers.38 When badges of caste
become commodified, we have to start thinking about legal
intervention to stop self-reinforcing stratification.
New educational technologies can lead to similar dynamics.
Academic doping has become a real problem on many
campuses, where students without Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) use Ritalin, Strattera, or other
pharmaceuticals used to treat ADHD to get an “edge.”39 Those
wary of caffeine-generated jitters may soon start using ProVigil
to purchase consequence-free all-nighters.40 Test-preparation
technologies are also creating inequalities; students able to
afford test-preparation courses, such as those offered by
Kaplan, have a definite advantage over those who do not have
access to such courses.41 The former have the benefit of the
37. SUSAN STARR SERED & RUSHIKA FERNANDOPULLE, UNINSURED IN
AMERICA: LIFE AND DEATH IN THE LAND OF OPPORTUNITY (2005).
38. Id. at 15 (“Because health care is so tightly linked to employment,
once an inclividual or a family is caught in the death spiral, it is nearly
impossible to find a way out. Unemployable or marginally employed because
of poor health, members of this new “untouchable caste” are denied consistent
access to medical care. Sick, lacking reliable health care, and locked in
employment situations (especially in the service sector—the same sector to
which India’s untouchables ere consigned) that do not offer medical benefits,
they find it increasingly difficult to escape.”).
39. LAWRENCE H. DILLER, RUNNING ON RITALIN 63 (1998); FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BITECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002); James Butcher, Cognitive Enhancement
Raises Ethical Concerns, 362(9378) LANCET, 132-133 (2003); Lawrence Diller,
The Run on Ritalin: Attention Deficit Disorder and Simulant Treatment in the
1990s, HASTING CENTER REPORT 26 (1996); Danielle C. Turner & Barbara J.
Sahakian, Neuroethics of Cognitive Enhancement, 1 BIOSOCIETIES 113 (2006).
40. GREG CRITSER, GENERATION RX: HOW PRESCRIPTION DRUGS ARE
ALTERING AMERICAN LIVES, MINDS, AND BODIES (2005).
41. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE
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collective insights of hundreds of test takers who report back on
small portions of the test to central headquarters.42
Perhaps most discouragingly, efforts to regulate such
advantages have failed entirely in at least one context. After
the South Korean parliament banned “cram schools” in the
early 1990s due to their inequality-enhancing effect, that
country’s Supreme Court intervened to declare this tutoring a
constitutional right.43 Part of the court’s reasoning focused on
global competitiveness; it assumed that any country that
unilaterally decided to limit these forms of educational
competition would effectively “shoot itself in the foot” in the
global race for capital investment.44
Admittedly, egalitarian programs have to be conditioned by
awareness of the multiple levels of competition (both
temporally and spatially) of which any given competition is
part.45 For example, in South Korea, an attempt to level the
playing field within the country, at a particular time, was
deemed by its Supreme Court to be naïve, given its effects on
long-term competition by South Koreans in the global economy.
Therefore, my contention here is not that the law should cripple
the development of these new technologies; most have many

AMERICAN MERITOCRACY (1999); Malcolm Gladwell, What Stanley Kaplan
Taught Us About the SAT, NEW YORKER, Dec. 17, 2001, at 86, available at
http://www.gladwell.com/2001/2001_12_17_a_kaplan.htm.
42. LEMANN, supra note 41.
43. Extracurricular lesson ban case, 12-1 KCCR 427, 98Hun-Ka16,
98Hun-Ma429 (consolidated) (April 27, 2000), English translation in
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, DECISIONS OF THE KOREAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT
(2000)
1,
3
(2002),
available
at
http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/download/decision_2001.pdf
(“The
regulation of private education in Article 3 goes beyond the private dimension
of substantially infringing on the basic rights of parents and children in
private education . . . . There is a question as [to] the effectiveness of Article 3
in the accomplishment of the legislative purpose, [on the] one hand, and
Article 3 produces substantial restrictive impact on basic rights and
substantial disadvantages in the accomplishment of a cultural state, on the
other. Therefore, Article 3 departs widely from a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the public interest obtained through the restriction
and the restrictive impact caused by the restriction, and therefore violates the
balance of interests.”)
44. Id. (“Cultural poverty in this age of unlimited competition among
states for survival will ultimately lead to social and economic backwardness.”).
45. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE (2002) (discussing
perils of unilateral decisions to “disarm” in any particular technological
context).
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constructive uses. Rather, it is to argue that inequalityenhancement should be a quality of technology salient enough
to lead to some systematic evaluation of its effects. We see a
generalized solicitude for the environment in statutes like the
United States’ NEPA.46 As any American administrative law
professor can attest, there are many “impact statements” that
agencies must fill out to assess the effects of their actions on
small businesses, paperwork, and so on.47 Perhaps the law
should require similar analysis and disclosure of new
technological impact on inequality.
III. AGAINST COMPLACENT CONTINUUMISM
Technophiles and transhumanists are sure to challenge
any suggestion of forced disclosure. One of the primary
rhetorical tropes of opponents of regulation is to put all manner
of social change on a continuum and say “See, we’ve been doing
X for years, this new technology just lets us do it more quickly.”
46. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
Moreover, certain agencies have to figure out how some new technologies will
affect the environment. See, e.g., Nanotechnology Law, When Nano Turns
Washing
Machine
Into
Pesticide,
http://nanotechlaw.blogspot.com/2006/12/when-nano-turns-washing-machineinto.html (Dec. 10, 2006, 07:38 EST) (discussing silver-based nanotechnology
in the Samsung C1235A washing machine, which EPA decided to regulate as a
pesticide).
47. See Daniel A. Farber, Bringing Environmental Assessment into the
Digital Age (UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 877625, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=877625. But see Mark Seidenfeld, A
Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 533, 533-34 (arguing that too many informational requirements have
been imposted on the regulatory process). Seidenfeld catalogs the waves of
informational requirements; inequality impact statements could fit into any of
the following:
The early 1970s, an era that introduced statutorily mandated review
of agency action to ensure adequate assessment of environmental
impacts, together with judicial demands for adequately reasoned
decisions, began a transformation of the notice and comment process
into one requiring extensive documentation of the information on
which the agency relies and detailed explanation of the choices the
agency made in deciding to adopt a rule. The late 1970s through the
1980s marked the White House’s commencement of its own demands
for rigorous regulatory impact analyses—potentially mammoth
studies that attempt not only to identify but also to quantify the costs
and benefits of a rule. Not to be outdone, Congress increased the
statutory demands on agencies’ promulgation of rules, requiring
analyses of impacts on such entities as small businesses and state,
local and tribal governments. And the President continues to impose
yet additional considerations by executive orders.
Id.
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For example, genetic engineering is framed as just a faster
version of selective breeding (in the agricultural context) or
assortative mating (in the human context).48 Cognitive
enhancement is viewed as a more efficient version of education:
“Much of what we learn in school is ‘mental software’ for
managing various cognitive domains: mathematics, categories
of concepts, language, and problem solving in particular
subjects.”49 Along these lines, one might claim that the
equality-eroding effects of the aforementioned technologies are
trivial in comparison with social sources of inequality. We can
deem this line of thought “complacent continuumism” (CC). On
the CC view, technology is just one more way of accomplishing
ends that would once have been attained via slower or less
efficient cultural or social methods.
However, the CC view is based on analogies that fall apart
under scrutiny. Technology is often far more sudden, effective,
and commodifiable than social or cultural methods of
accomplishing ends. In the case of cognitive enhancement,
many educational institutions have made a point of assuring
some kind of equality of access.50 Have we any guarantees that
“smart pills” would come with similar assurances? Moreover,
educational gains in ability come very slowly in comparison
with potential chemical interventions.
There are more
opportunities to regulate, more “pressure points,” and more
cultural traditions of access, in the case of educational
institutions, than in the case of their potential chemical or
genetic enhancers.
Indeed, any hope of an egalitarian program depends on
some coherent and durable store of human values capable of
guiding our regulation of technology.
However, selfmanipulation via technology may itself affect those values.51
48. Assortative mating refers to the tendency of individuals to marry
other individuals of a similar socioeconomic status and IQ. See MICKEY KAUS,
THE END OF EQUALITY (1992); Kate Zernike, Why Are There So Many Single
Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, § 4, at 1.
49. Nick Bostrom & Anders Sandberg, Cognitive Enhancement: Methods,
Ethics, Regulatory Challenges, SCI. AND ENGINEERING ETHICS (forthcoming
2007)
(manuscript
at
3),
available
at
http://www.nickbostrom.com/cognitive.pdf.
50. See FULLINWIDER & LICHTENBERG, supra note 14 (on higher
education); Karen W. Arenson, Harvard Extends Breaks for Low-Income
Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar, 31, 2006, at A10.
51. Admittedly, technology can give us a better understanding of the
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As Joel Garreau has argued, human beings are not merely the
authors of technological change, but also its objects, to an
extent barely imaginable in earlier times.52 The convergence of
genetics, robotics, information technology, and nanotechnology
(GRIN) has radically altered our sense of the possible in the
realm of self-manipulation.
Consider the potential for cosmetic psychopharmacology to
dampen or reverse negative emotional states.53 On a purely
individualist and hedonist account of well-being, we should
welcome such a development—surely no more effective method
of attaining subjective satisfaction could be designed.54 But if
we share Martha Nussbaums’s account of emotions as
judgments of value, a great deal may be lost.55 The technology
world and ourselves. Technology can play a crucial role in revealing to us the
partiality or error of our assumptions.
The telescope revealed the
shortcomings of a geocentric worldview, occasioning all manner of responsive
revisions in elite and popular thought. Philosopher Charles Taylor would call
such breakthroughs, and many of their social repercussions, “epistemic gains,”
which permit us a clearer and better view of the world and ourselves.
CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 17-18 (1995).
52. JOEL GARREAU, RADICAL EVOLUTION: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF
ENHANCING OUR MINDS, OUR BODIES – AND WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN
(2005).
53. See RONALD DWORKIN, ARTIFICIAL HAPPINESS: THE DARK SIDE OF THE
NEW HAPPY CLASS 17 (2006) (“Since the mind sets limits on behavior, small
changes in the mind may have serious social consequences. When a man
silences his misery through Artificial Happiness, he also silences his
conscience.”). See also MARY EBERSTADT, HOME-ALONE AMERICA: THE
HIDDEN TOLL OF DAY CARE, BEHAVIORAL DRUGS, AND OTHER PARENT
SUBSTITUTES 68 (2004) (“[A] great deal of what was yesterday judged normal
behavior is now pathologized and stigmatized in unprecedented degree.”). I
focus on the term
“cosmetic” to distinguish between the therapeutic
alleviation of abnormal states (such as depression), and the enhancement of
emotion to the point of feeling “better than well.” So “cosmetic” is meant to
designate, not the triviality or superficiality of the intervention, but rather,
how different it is from classic methods of restoring health to a norm.
54. Wayne Sumner, a University of Toronto philosopher, has stated that
“[t]ime and philosophical fashion have not been kind to hedonism . . . Although
hedonistic theories of various sorts flourished for three centuries or so in the
congenial empiricist habitat, they have all but disappeared from the scene.”
Will Wilkinson, In Pursuit of Happiness Research: Is It Reliable? What Does It
Imply for Policy?, POLICY ANALYSIS, Apr. 11, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa590.pdf.
55. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001); Frank Pasquale, Two Concepts of
Immortality: Reframing Public Debate on Stem-Cell Research, 14 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 73, 110 (2002) (“Ideally, we aim not merely to maximize our own
pleasure, but to lead a balanced life of self-fulfillment and obligation to work,
family, friends, and civil society.
When psychopharmacology helps us
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may well have “extended human capacity,” but for what end?
More importantly, will it diminish the possibility of our rightly
discerning our ends?
To bioethicist Carl Elliott, using drugs to alleviate mild
alienation may lead to self-betrayal, since intuitions about the
worth or worthlessness of forms of life around us are
constitutive of our identity.56 Peter Kramer counters that
current drugs do not dispatch such intuitions, but only relieve
the negative affect they generate in those who hold them.57
This response does not begin to address the potential social
concerns raised by future technological interventions. When
designer drugs become focused not merely on the alleviation of
depression, but on the destruction of all manner of negative
mental states, their users may well become incapable of feeling
the force of reasons that might once have led them to promote
or accept the regulation of such drugs.
The difficult question for regulators of various
performance-enhancing neuropharmacological interventions is
whether they have the potential to blunt users’ perceptions of
the deep changes they wreak in users themselves. Substance
addiction has been modeled as a case of “increasing marginal
utility,” in which the more one uses, the more one wants. New
neural performance enhancement addiction might work in a far
subtler way—by blunting the appeal of alternate sources of
value and satisfaction.
The same competitive dynamics described above in the
case of education, salience (in search results), and competence,
may lead to the commodification of mood in the modern
workplace. Management consultants and career counselors
value positivity, team players, and “people persons.” Those
who do not fit this increasingly Procrustean mold are less likely
to be tolerated in the workforce when quick and easy

constructively connect to these realms, it is to be applauded. To the extent
that it enables us to endure or ignore disconnection, it is suspect.”).
56. Carl
Elliott,
Medicate
Your
Dissent,
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~ellio023/medicate.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2006).
57. PETER KRAMER, LISTENING TO PROZAC (1993); PETER D. KRAMER,
AGAINST DEPRESSION (2005) (making “an insistent argument that depression
is a disease, one we would do well to oppose wholeheartedly.”); David
DeGrazia, Prozac, Enhancement, and Self-Creation, 30 HASTINGS CTR.
REPORT no. 2, at 35 (2000) (arguing that new psychotropic drugs promote
autonomy by widening the range of projects one can conceivably take on).
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pharmaceutical interventions could “cure” them.58 As Nikolas
Rose notes, new techniques of self-manipulation create ever
more pressure toward responsibilization, in which individuals
are held responsible for aspects of the self that in the past were
not deemed under their control.59 Today, parents who “insist”
on having children with Down’s Syndrome are greeted with
increasing incomprehension; perhaps tomorrow will see
increasing intolerance of any mood profiles that fail to conduce
to maximum productivity.
CONCLUSION
The great techno-skeptics Jacques Ellul and Langdon
Winner have argued that technological change has its own
logic, bending to its ends the legal structures originally
designed to constrain it.60 Ellul’s writing style is often opaque,
and it is not clear how technology has the agency necessary to
create the effects he describes.61 In this brief essay, I have
attempted to fill this causal aporia by tracing interrelationships

58. Compare Lindsey A. Vacco, Comment, Preimplantation Genetic
Diagnosis: From Preventing Genetic Disease to Customizing Children. Can the
Technology be Regulated Based on the Parents’ Intent?, 49 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1181
(2005), with William Saletan, Better than Sex: The growing practice of embryo
eugenics, SLATE, Sept. 16, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2149772/ (“P.G.D.
prevents hellish diseases. In those cases, you have to say yes. And once you
start saying yes, it’s hard to say no. That’s why they call it a slippery slope.”).
In the case of preimplantation genetic diagnosis, many worry that society will
become less tolerant of those disabled by conditions that their parents could
have selected against either before or at an early stage of pregnancy. In the
case of mood-alteration, those with difficult or just shy personalities may not
be tolerated as well in the future as society begins to expect such individuals
to take drugs to “cure” their diffidence. Of course, we should welcome
interventions that curb genuinely abusive behavior. See, e.g., ROBERT I.
SUTTON, THE NO ASSHOLE RULE: BUILDING A CIVILIZED WORKPLACE AND
SURVIVING ONE THAT ISN’T (2007) (best-selling business book arguing for “zero
tolerance” of cruelty in the workplace).
59. See NIKOLAS ROSE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE ITSELF: BIOMEDICINE,
POWER, AND SUBJECTIVITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 134 (2007).
60. See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964); LANGDON
WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNICS-OUT-OF-CONTROL AS A
THEME IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1977)
61. For a definition of agency, see CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS VOL. I: HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 15-16 (“What is it that we
attribute to ourselves as human agents which we would not attribute to
animals? . . . [W]hat is distinctively human is the power to evaluate our
desires, to regard some as desirable and others as undesirable.”). Given this
sense of the nature of agency and free will, it is difficult to understand how
technology can possess it.
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among technology, competition, commodification, and values in
an array of human endeavors.
Technology in itself cannot force individuals to do
anything. However, structures of competition and inequality
can raise the price of failure to adopt technology such that
acquiescence is all but inevitable.62 Moreover, as technology
promises to cure the stress and anxiety attendant on
recognition of such realties, it may lull us into an acceptance of
“realities” that our better selves would abjure. Theories of law
and technology must address these situations in the future.

62. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987).

